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Background Variation in the ap-
proaches taken to contain the 
SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandem-
ic at country level has been shaped 
by economic and political consid-
erations, technical capacity, and as-
sumptions about public behaviours. 
To address the limited application 
of learning from previous pandem-
ics, this study aimed to analyse per-
ceived facilitators and inhibitors 
during the pandemic and to inform 
the development of an assessment 
tool for pandemic response plan-
ning.
Methods A cross-sectional electron-
ic survey of health and non-health 
care professionals (5 May - 5 June 
2020) in six languages, with re-
spondents recruited via email, so-
cial media and website posting. 
Participants were asked to score in-
hibitors (-10 to 0) or facilitators (0 
to +10) impacting country response 
to COVID-19 from the following do-
mains – Political, Economic, Socio-
logical, Technological, Ecological, 
Legislative, and wider Industry (the 
PESTELI framework). Participants 
were then asked to explain their re-
sponses using free text. Descriptive 
and thematic analysis was followed 
by triangulation with the literature 
and expert validation to develop the 
assessment tool, which was then 
compared with four existing pan-
demic planning frameworks.
Cite as: Ahmad R, Atum RA, Birgand G, Castro-Sánchez E, Charani E, Ferlie EB, Hussain I, Kambugu A, Labarca 
J, Hara GL, McKee M, Mendelson M, Singh S, Varma J, Zhu NJ, Zingg W, Holmes AH; the COMPASS (COntrol 
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As the COVID-19) pandemic continues to spread worldwide, countries affected earliest (China, Italy, France) 
are reviewing strategies for resurgences [1] and numerous inquiries are under way. The threat of the pandemic 
continues to challenge scientific and policy communities because of the inadequately understood characteris-
tics of the virus and rapidity of spread. The absence of licensed vaccines or effective antiviral therapies mean 
that non-pharmaceutical interventions remain central to the response. Managing COVID-19 continues to raise 
societal dilemmas - breaking the chain of transmission through find, track, trace, isolate and support (FTTIS) 
systems amid concerns about privacy [2], widespread restrictions that themselves pose threats to the health 
of individuals and the economy [3,4]; implementing optimal clinical management protocols for those affected 
in health systems struggling to cope; and procuring supplies of the ultimate protection, a vaccine where there 
is uncertainty about its sustained efficacy and uptake even once it is available [5,6]. While we know that the 
pandemic is having an immediate impact on households and the wider economy, the long-term impact on 
health (Abbott, 2020; National Institute for Health Research, 2020), and social and economic consequenc-
es is yet to be quantified [7,8]. The nature and timing of response strategies has varied from strict and com-
plete lockdown of cities and regions (eg, China) through a phased approach with implementation of track 
and trace taking primacy (Singapore, New Zealand) to a rejection of widespread restrictions (Sweden) or pas-
sive approaches (Brazil). In the current pandemic, the rationale for implementation of lockdown is not always 
explicit but ranges from protection of limited health care capacity (in Argentina and some central European 
countries), to stop-start implementation to mitigate catastrophic economic effects on the poor (Pakistan), and 
perception that the public may become complacent or fatigued (England). Other countries were able to mo-
bilise technology-led approaches, such as Iceland with a biobank covering 6% of its population [9] or Ger-
many, with extensive laboratory capacity [10]. Grouping countries by economic capability on usual measures 
(eg, gross domestic product (GDP)) does not seem to explain either the response strategy or the outcomes as 
measured by mortality [11]. Positive outliers based on economic determinants include Thailand and Greece, 
negative outliers include the UK and USA. Small, wealthy nations (eg, Qatar, Bahrain) have also had poorer 
outcomes than predicted by GDP. Other explanatory determinants such as prevailing societal norms found in 
democratic, or command and control and more autocratic political contexts also show a mixed picture with 
failures and successes associated with each [12,13], although countries with leaders pursuing populist policies 
seem to perform sub-optimally [14].
The current pandemic is on a scale not seen for a century, as to date other viruses with potential to cause pan-
demics have been contained regionally and, in some cases, suppressed in human populations (SARS-CoV-1, 
Zika). The learning from the published evidence base, can be grouped into three main categories. The first, a 
multitude of commentaries and opinion pieces; second, pandemic preparedness plans from national and inter-
national organisations, comprising overall guidance and detailed operational plans at local/regional level and 
a suite of predictive tools; and third, secondary or primary research to assess the contextual factors which in-
fluenced how the epidemic was managed. In a literature review of this third category [15] covering epidemics 
since 2000, only one of 19 studies examined all domains of an established strategic management framework 
spanning seven domains: political, economic, sociological, technological, ecological, legislative and wider in-
dustry (PESTELI) [16]; while 6 considered the sociological domain alone. Data used for analyses are largely 
confined to secondary sources with only 6 studies employing primary and secondary or mixed methods ap-
proaches, so, they do not benefit from multi-disciplinary inquiry and the necessary data triangulation. More-
over, the findings from analyses are often too late or inadequately disseminated and therefore do not effectively 
support learning and preparedness for future pandemics.
This study aimed to analyse perceived drivers and barriers during the 2020 pandemic, to start to address the 
evident gaps in coordinated reflection and communication [17] and respond to the call for real-time analysis 
during a pandemic [18]. We mobilise the PESTELI framework, routinely used in strategic management to as-
sess the environment, but under-used in public and global health [15,19], and provide a comprehensive ap-
proach for guiding assessments of preparedness at the country level for the immediate and longer term.
Results 928 respondents from 66 countries (57% health care professionals) participated. Political and 
economic influences were consistently perceived as powerful negative forces and technology as a facili-
tator across high- and low-income countries. The 103-item tool developed for guiding rapid situational 
assessment for pandemic planning is comprehensive when compared to existing tools and highlights the 
interconnectedness of the 7 domains.
Conclusions The tool developed and proposed addresses the problems associated with decision making 
in disciplinary silos and offers a means to refine future use of epidemic modelling.
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METHODS
Study design and participants
We developed an online survey, which allowed anonymous submissions between 5 May 2020 and 5 June 
2020 using Qualtrics (Provo, UT, USA). The Uniform Resource Locator (URL) link to the survey was widely 
distributed through a range of social media platforms reaching target groups, including the European Com-
mittee on Infection Control (EUCIC), International Society for Infectious Diseases, Réseau de Prévention des 
Infections Associées aux Soins (RéPias), and the international participants in a massive open online course on 
applying Social Science for tackling Antimicrobial Resistance. The survey could also be accessed through the 
project webpage (https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/197358/strategic-planning-pandemic-management/) and 
was cascaded by email to collaborators. Participants consented to the use of their data in the study before ac-
cessing the questionnaire. The 31-item survey based on the seven domain PESTELI framework (electronic sur-
vey and Table S1 in the Online Supplementary Document) was pre-tested and piloted, translated and piloted 
again (the link to the electronic survey is provided in the Online Supplementary Document). The survey was 
made available in 6 languages (English, French, Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Portuguese, and Korean). Par-
ticipants were asked to score inhibitors (-10 to 0) or facilitators (0 to +10) impacting their country’s response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic in the seven domains included in the PESTELI framework and provide free-text 
comments. No word limit was imposed on responses. Upon completion of the survey, the participants could 
opt-in to be followed-up in six months (December 2020) and one year (May 2021).
Data analysis and assessment tool development
We report the perceived impact of each PESTELI domain as the percentage of participants scoring within 
the integer interval from -10 through to +10. The analysis was performed for the global survey data set (all 
countries) and then for individual countries with a sample size greater than 15: Argentina, China, Colombia, 
France, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, the United Kingdom (UK), and the Unit-
ed States of America (USA). During the study period (5 May 2020 to 5 Jun 2020), China, France, Spain, and 
the UK had passed the peak of the pandemic, while Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, South 
Africa and the USA were still experiencing an increasing number of new daily cases (Figure S2 in the Online 
Supplementary Document). In addition, we calculated the mean score for each PESTELI domain for each 
continent. We performed data analysis using STATA 15 (StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA), and presented 
the mean scores in Figure 1, using six heat maps. The size of each heat map indicates the sample size of each 
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continent. We used a colour gradient, deeper red, to illustrate a a high negative mean score, and deeper green 
to illustrate a higher positive mean score. We avoided erroneous attempts to establish statistical correlations as 
the outcomes of the pandemic are still unfolding in different parts of the world and this would be premature. 
Additionally, sampling was not representative of any particular professional group within countries.
We analysed all free text responses, blinded by country to reduce bias, sequentially, by language of response. 
Thematic analysis of all English responses was conducted by four researchers (RA, ECS, NJZ, GJCB), followed 
by analysis of the responses in other languages through automated translation to English in parallel with anal-
ysis within the source language. The themes were then validated by each multi-lingual co-investigator in the 
source language and differences resolved by discussion. While the themes were derived from barriers or fa-
cilitators or ‘both’, in the synthesised results these emergent factors are presented in a neutral language. This 
is to help formulate a construct or theme which can be objectively assessed. The qualitative themes are not 
presented by the country of respondent, as the themes are not necessarily representative of a country but de-
signed to be inclusive of as many country contexts as possible. The respondent type is included in the illus-
trative quotes to provide some context.
The themes were validated with three types of triangulation (Thiessen & Denzin, 1970): 1) data triangulation - 
triangulated with findings from our literature review ([15]); 2) methodological triangulation - mapped against 
the existing pandemic preparedness tools, including the Global Health Security Index [20]; the International 
Health Regulations [21]; the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework [22]; the Epidemic Prepared-
ness Index [23]; 3) investigator triangulation - the themes were further validated by the authors comprising a 
range of multi-professional clinicians and experts (infectious diseases in high-, middle- and low-income set-
tings, clinical pathology, health policy, health economics, organisational theory, sociology, digital health, and 
innovation adoption).
This thematic analysis resulted in the 103-item tool for assessing the macro-environment at the national level.
Ethics




The survey was completed by 928 respondents from 66 countries with a sample of 15 or more from 12 coun-
tries (Figure S2 in the Online Supplementary Document). This corresponded to a 68% response rate, calcu-
lated as the proportion of respondents going on to complete the survey of those that had opened the survey 
link. 588 respondents completed the survey in a language other than English. 67% of respondents work in 
health care organisations, of which, 85% are health care professionals. 15% work in academic institutes, 4% 
work in the private health care industry, 3% work in national or local government, 2% work in the private 
non-health care industry, 1% work in the international or national charity sector, 1% work in social care or-
ganisations and 7% work in ‘other’ organisations. 36% provided free text explanatory comments in addition to 
scoring. 41% provided an email address to be followed up.
Quantitative scoring
The aggregate mean scores by continent (Figure 1) including responses from all respondents provides a crude 
snapshot of perceptions. While each country may be vastly different, in terms of context and baseline infra-
structure of health systems and economy, it is important to use this level of analysis when looking at pandem-
ics as there are common issues in a threat of this nature. Notable inhibitors are ecological factors in Oceania, 
economic factors in South and North America, and additionally, political and sociological factors in North 
America. All continents register facilitating influences in the technological domain (range 2.9 to 5.2). Politi-
cal factors are perceived positively in Oceania (5.6) and Africa (4.6) but neutral in Europe (0.6). The country 
breakdown for those with a sample size greater than 20 is shown in Figure 2.
The perceived facilitators and inhibitors for these nine countries are shown in Figure 2 and demonstrate the 
proportionate scoring within each domain. With the exception of China, overall, the lowest (-10) and highest 
(+10) are in the political and technological domains respectively.
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Thematic analysis
The thematic analysis and synthesis resulted in 103 themes in total, with 7 crossing two or more domains 
(Figure 3). Though respondents were not directly asked to consider impacts of COVID- 19 on the macro-en-
vironment, this emerged from the data analysis and is reported.
Figure 2. PESTELI domain scoring: by country. Panel A. Argentina. Panel B. China. Panel C. Colombia. Panel D. France. Panel E. Mexi-
co. Panel F. Pakistan. Panel G. Paraguay. Panel H. South Africa. Panel I. Spain. Panel J. Thailand. Panel K. United Kingdom (UK). Panel 
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The themes under the political and technological domains are now discussed in more detail, followed by the 
themes which cross two or more domains. Finally, the perceived impact of the COVID-19 pandemic back on 
the macro-environment are presented. In each of the countries, inhibiting political factors (with the exception 
of China) and facilitative technological factors attained the most extreme scores.
Political
The themes within the political domain were highly interconnected, with some factors acting as a precursor 
or determinant of other barriers within the political domain and other domains.
Lack of strategy and of detailed plans were seen as allowing politics to take primacy in decision making and 
politicisation of the pandemic.
“Because of the lack of effective pre-planning regarding healthcare policies and systems, political factors 
and leadership became a huge barrier” (R 625– other)
“The pandemic is used to make local politics, regardless of the risk to patients or doctors” (R:HCP).
Notably missing were comments about any political party but there was criticism of individual leaders and 
leadership.
“Our leadership at a national level has made the handling of this pandemic much more difficult. Get-
ting mixed messages from the top causes people’s behaviour to change based on incorrect information” 
(R 819: Private industry)
While mention of leadership is unsurprising, respondents were nuanced in their assessments of it, acknowl-
edging challenges faced by leaders. However, the words transparency and trust featured prominently, whether 
lamenting their absence or celebrating their presence. Concerns were also raised about the mechanism, fre-
quency, and format of the communication and the extent of scientific involvement and use of their recom-
mendations by policy makers.
“It’s a difficult time for anyone to be a leader, but to date, there has been a lack of transparency… the 
picture painted is always of a government having made all the right decisions at the right time. This is 
not the case. I am also concerned about the vilification of scientists who we now see being used as scape-
goats for the decisions made” (R 281: Private Healthcare)
“…the responsibility of the government to take care of its citizens was also poor, which further affected 
the “trust” with its people” (R133:HCP)
“I believe that the public generally trust their government and follow the recommendations. This facil-
itates their adherence to the measures taken against the pandemic” (R: HCP/academia/local govern-
ment).
Figure 3. Qualitative themes in PESTELI domains.
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Political structures and processes were identified as important factors, but in ways that varied. An example is 
the degree of centralisation of governance structures, with some devolved systems portrayed as fragmented 
and deviating from central government messaging or, on the other hand, allowing measures to be implement-
ed rapidly that were appropriate to local context.
“Governors and Mayors are technically guided. Federal leadership is more political, confusing and many 
times not ethical and overall irresponsible” (R: HCP).
“Political system (set up) leads to huge advantage in managing the pandemic, enabled fast coordinated 
action and resource mobilisation” (R: other)
The pace of political decisions was an important factor in both centralised and devolved structures and rap-
id decision making was mostly seen as a facilitator, except when a government was perceived as corrupt (see 
corruption theme below).
The timing of the pandemic in relation to the election cycle was perceived as important. When an election was 
close, decisions were seen as driven by the need for popularity and short-term wins.
“The current government desperation to hold on to power has blind-sided the health of nation thus mak-
ing their action reactive rather than proactive in addressing COVID-19” (R9: HCP).
“The pandemic came 4 months after a new government that received the country in very poor condition. 
But they made great decisions, putting everyone’s health first” (R: HCP).
Technological
While the technological domain was scored as a facilitating factor in all countries, many of the themes address 
the potential, often unmet, of technology, and particularly its timely uptake and utilisation. Respondents re-
ferred to issues of existing technologies which needed to be scaled up and rolled out. Respondents also talked 
about simple technologies (eg, 3D printed visors) to more advanced technologies such as a networked surveil-
lance/track and trace system.
“There should have been more in place prior to the pandemic rising to a level of emergency” (R82: other).
Weaknesses in the ability to implement and scale up technology were seen as a barrier, also influenced by is-
sues in the economic domain.
“…but if resources had been allocated in advance, the measures would have been implemented quicker 
“without panic”. I think that before “innovating”, you have to be solid on the basics. In this case, this was 
not the case - race for masks and respirators, lack of staff in the teams, lack of space in establishments. 
Previous closures of beds, failure to respond to various requests from hospital staff as part of ‘economy’ 
measures in public hospitals” (R: social care professional).
However, the challenge was not limited to advanced technology. Access to basic equipment was also prob-
lematic.
“I am afraid that a belief in ‘innovation’ and technological solutions (e.g. tracing apps) as sexy silver 
bullets rather than a dedication to tried and tested public health tracking, tracing isolating work done by 
qualified people has severely damaged the ability to get on top of the disease. Likewise the fetishisation 
of favoured companies to produce novel ventilators rather than having good traditional existing capac-
ity and supplier networks is problematic” (R24: academic).
“Technology helped in two ways, first in testing, treating, and tracing, and surveillance. The second for 
maintaining regular living activities, the Wechat health code (QR code red amber green system to tell if 
you were allowed to travel), food delivery, logistics, and online teaching, all helped” (R: other).
Additionally, while technology was noted as a facilitator for communication and e-health, this was counter-
balanced by the potential for spread of misinformation.
“Difficulty by social networks, fake news and the fact that everyone gives their opinion” (R: HCP).
Content and process of scientific advice for decision making
A theme which transcends five domains is the content and process of the scientific advice and how and if this 
was used in decision making. The pace and mobilisation of research and development by academic and re-
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“Suppression of much of the scientific research from any field” (R: other).
In terms of content, there was some perceived difference in the weight placed on medical/scientific and eco-
nomic issues when selecting ‘evidence’ to inform strategies to adopt. In terms of process, some reported that 
domestic and international scientific advice sometimes conflicted or were taken up selectively by policy makers.
“Political decisions are made without technical assistance or politicians manipulate technical aspects at 
their convenience” (R: HCP)
However, some policy makers were seen as searching for the best evidence.
“They care about the health of all of us. Trying not to collapse the health system. I like that he listens to 
the doctors” (R: other)
“Right decisions were made analyzing experiences from other countries” (R: academic)
Existing socio-economic disparities/poverty/hunger
Across high-, middle- and low-income countries, disparities and inequities affected almost every aspect of the 
response.
“COVID-19 will change the face of digital society. That said I speak from the perspective of a middle-in-
come citizen who can afford the internet and a laptop. Only about +-50%-60% of our population use 
the internet…” (R280: private health care industry)
Socio-economic conditions that older people lived in were noted as barriers to effective responses, especially 
where informal support networks were weak and there were gaps in social services. Economic vulnerability 
impaired the public’s ability to adopt protective measures, either voluntarily or in compliance with national 
policies. This theme links also with Inclusivity of vulnerable groups in mitigation plans, under the political do-
main. Challenges facing health care workers struggling to sustain themselves and their families in the face of 
economic uncertainty was an inhibitor, just as it was for the general population and for patients in particular. 
Of the support available in the poorest countries:
“…this support comes nowhere close to closing the gaps in access to economic, education, healthcare” 
(R25, academic)
Legislative implementation capacity
Legislative inconsistency was in part attributed to fragmentation between central and local governments, while 
a failure to implement legislation was a barrier in several domains, sometimes exacerbated by a lack of struc-
tures to enforce legislation. The ability to enforce legislation was also shaped by social norms, Cultural tendency 
(compliant vs defiant), as well as the Methods and rate of diffusion of knowledge through society, and perceptions of 
risk. Employing persuasive approaches rather than, or in some combination with, mandatory measures (and 
the need for legislation) are considerations under the political domain.
Corruption
Corruption was cited as a barrier, including political and economic forms of corruption. Responses to the pan-
demic were impeded in the presence of endemic corruption.
“…is a common denominator, it is a drag…” (R: national government)
“…conditioned by elements of sectarianism and corruption” (R: Social care organisation)
“The National Legislative Power does not work. Laws that protect citizens are not passed, everything is 
done by the president through personal decrees. We are under an undemocratic, corrupt and authori-
tarian regime” (R: HCP).
The crisis was seen as creating opportunities for corruption and political opportunism.
“The government took advantage of the moment to monopolize everything in the executive branch and 
inactivate the Judiciary and Parliament…We have an undemocratic, authoritarian and corrupt gov-
ernment” (R: HCP)
Impact of COVID-19 on the domains
Impact of COVID-19 on the macro-environment was noted in three domains – sociological, ecological and 
industry.
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Sociological – The negative effects include declines in mental well-being largely from physical and social isola-
tion, especially among vulnerable groups. The rise in domestic violence and other crimes were cited. Positive 
impacts included opportunities for change in social norms and behaviours.
Ecological – Raised awareness about zoonoses and one-health, bringing an opportunity for change was noted. 
The dip in air pollution levels was also noted as a positive consequence. Negative impacts included risks to 
food security and agriculture and the increased use of disposable products.
Industry – Positive impacts on industry were initiation and adoption of new mechanisms and tools (eg, of mo-
lecular and other surveillance) and a stimulus to research and innovation. The negative impacts however are 
shortages of health care workers due to infection of frontline staff.
Themes mapped against the existing pandemic preparedness tools
Mapping of existing tools against the PESTELI framework shows good coverage across the 7 domains. The high 
level assessment (Figure S3 in the Online Supplementary Document), however, does not reveal the missed 
opportunities apparent from a more granular assessment as demonstrated by the detailed mapping of the ex-
isting tools against the 103 themes developed through the qualitative analysis (Figures S4 and S5 in the On-
line Supplementary Document). While the political and ecological domains are well represented in existing 
tools, there are major gaps in coverage of themes in the remaining five domains.
DISCUSSION
Existing predictive tools have so far been unable to adequately predict or explain the observed outcomes in 
terms of morbidity and mortality during this evolving pandemic. One of the most widely used tools, the Glob-
al Health Security Index, scored the USA and the UK top in the world [20]. Both countries however are deal-
ing with challenges in bringing this pandemic under control, as are many other countries who scored poorly 
according to the index. The reductionist approach employed in that tool risks missing critical issues that have 
become apparent as the pandemic is unfolding. Analysis of this and other tools show the discrepancy between 
objective measures of preparedness and what actually happened [24,25]. It is clear that the political domain 
needs much more attention. We are urged that decisions be based on science and to consider consequences for 
vulnerable populations [26,27], but there is less consensus about what that evidence base should constitute. 
Additionally, the translation of evidence to policy is highly mediated by political factors. The effectiveness of 
overall system governance across health and social care systems is also key.
Several commentators have noted how those countries that experienced the 2015 outbreak of Middle East re-
spiratory syndrome (MERS) - such as South Korea- and the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
pandemic such as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam - have been able to introduce public health measures fairly 
quickly and sustain a strong response to the epidemic.
We suggest that a more holistic approach to pandemic preparedness is needed, focusing especially on the in-
terconnectedness of the different domains discussed in this paper. An effective approach should also draw 
on how countries have dealt with other infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis (TB) and human immuno-
deficiency viruses/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) to strengthen the response to this and 
emergent pandemics [7].
This is the first study to be conducted during a pandemic using a strategic management lens and can support 
contemporary assessment of how countries are responding and adapting. The timing of this study should al-
low assessment prior to probable resurgences as restrictions are lifted.
The themes within these domains are not all quantifiable – but there are already detailed instruments which 
can be mobilised to make the required assessments. Existing frameworks, include the TAPIC (Transparency, 
Accountability, Participation, Integrity, Capacity), to assess the quality of governance [28]; multiple vulnera-
bility indexes have been developed to predict the impact on population sub-groups, including from the cur-
rent COVID-19 pandemic in India and Kenya [29,30]; an e-health readiness assessment framework has been 
designed for low-resourced settings but is equally needed in high-income settings [31]; and recently, a survey 
assessing public confidence/trust in government [32]. Together, these respond to the identified need for met-
rics that can inform strategic planning [33].
Limitations of the study include potential differences in perceptions by those in countries at different stages 
of the pandemic, who have varied in their opportunity to draw lessons, and the variable sample size. In our 
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Also, we do not know how respondents considered the domains temporally, comparing new or old impacts 
from each of the domains. The free text qualitative data suggest both were considered. Of course, the scores 
are based on ‘perceptions’ of the respondents, which may reflect a reality (or not), and further exploration is 
needed to understand the foundations of these perceptions. We cannot know or control for respondent’s po-
litical ideology which may influence the results.
In terms of the tool, while there is no way of knowing which score would or should be optimal, detailed case 
studies can help formulate some benchmarks. Scores and their distributions may be compared within coun-
tries over time to track change, potentially compared to similarly organised/funded health care systems.
In conclusion, the future possibilities of using this tool are to assess pandemic preparedness ahead of possible 
resurgences of COVID-19 and during periods when the restrictions are eased or lifted. Immediate next steps 
for researchers and policy makers are to operationalise the tool in different country settings using the data 
which we already have and prospectively collect data which is needed. Additionally, and critically, such an as-
sessment should be part of the cycle of review of national policies, integrated into systems strengthening and 
planning, not only for pandemic preparedness, but also in non-pandemic scenarios.
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